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Abstract
Smart contracts on a blockchain behave precisely as specified by their code. A vulnerability in
this code can lead to unexpected behaviour, which is hard to fix because a blockchain does not allow
to change smart contract code after its deployment.
Such vulnerabilities have led to several incidents. In the aftermath of such an event, a hard-fork
between Ethereum and Ethereum classic was the result. This thesis proposes to develop a new smart
contract programming language with the primary focus on safety, auditability, and the intention to
prevent as many of the known categories of vulnerabilities by design as possible. The programming
language’s code is validated during deployment and afterwards isolated from other smart contracts
running on the same blockchain to enforce compile-time guarantees during runtime. The designed
programming language does evaluate new concepts and paradigms rarely used in non-smart contract
environments for their potential benefit in a smart contract environment.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Smart contracts are autonomous entities managing valuable assets, such as cryptocurrency coins or own-
ership certificates. The code of a smart contract entirely defines its behaviour. A flaw in the code can
result in the loss or theft of the controlled assets. Developing bug-free software is challenging even for
skilled professionals [1]. Smart contract blockchains do not allow to revert the execution of a transaction.
Because of the value at stake, flaws and vulnerabilities in deployed smart contracts have a heightened
impact compared to flaws and vulnerabilities contained in the code of non-smart contract applications
(classical applications).
This research proposal presents an approach to improve the current situation for developers and auditors
alike by proposing a new smart contract programming language called Mandala that has a focus on
preventing such flaws and vulnerabilities. This is achieved by evaluating new concepts and paradigms
rarely used in non-smart contract environments for their potential benefit in a smart contract environment
and incorporating the results into Mandala.
1.1 Prior Work
During the Fast-Track Master proceeding this thesis, a paper with the title SmartDEMAP: A Smart
Contract Deployment and Management Platform[7] was published. The paper analysed the trade-off
between smart contracts that can not be changed after deployment (immutable, trustless) and the use
of patterns that allow exchanging the logic of a smart contract application after deployment (mutable,
trust needed). The paper proposed a solution in between where on chain management platform guards
the process of exchanging the logic of a smart contract application with the goal of reducing the trust
needed while still allow bugs to be fixed and new features to be added. It further proposed the idea that
such a management platform could benefit from a custom smart contract programming language that is
aware of the capabilities of the platform and can use them to their full extent.
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1.2 Mandala Overview
Mandala is a statically typed language that has a type system with algebraic datatypes at its core.
Mandala is highly predictable and achieves that by only providing function calls where the called function
implementation is known during compilation (static method dispatch). This property is strengthened
further by not allowing recursion and only providing loops where the maximal number of iterations is
known during compilation. As a result, Mandala is not Turing complete but in return allows to calculate
during compilation an upper bound for the resources consumed when executed.
Mandala provides a novel approach for application isolation, access control to resources as well as
ownership tracking. It does this by recording and tracking capabilities on the types of values, and
only with the respective capability someone can create, inspect, drop or copy values of a certain type.
This concept is generic and allows developers to define custom capabilities which then allow safeguarding
function calls against callers that are not in possession of a value with the required capability. This makes
it possible to check access control and express ownership transfers (for example of an asset) statically at
compiletime instead of dynamically at runtime. To prevent shared state problems Mandala does provide
a minimalistic effect system and for error handling Mandala uses a concept somewhere in between error
codes and exceptions.
1.3 Motivation
Smart contracts and blockchains are a relatively new technology compared to other programmable plat-
forms like cloud systems. They promise to deliver a platform where applications can be run, which can
not be stopped, corrupted or censored and work across borders and at the same time deliver an unprece-
dented amount of transparency. For the first time applications that do not require any trust in a third
party to guarantee the correct and fair execution of an application becomes feasible in practice. With
blockchains and smart contracts, everybody can inspect the code that runs on it at any time and can
be ensured that exactly this code is executed and nothing else. Blockchains have the potential to be a
disruptive technology with a significant impact on computer sciences and enable whole new industries.
This is the motivation behind choosing smart contracts and blockchains as the area to advance through
scientific research with this research proposal.
When developing classical applications, there is always the possibility to redeploy software to fix bugs
if they appear during productive use. If a bug leads to damage, most of the time there is an official
party that can repair or minimise the damage by deploying new code and changing entries in a database
or other state holding systems. A smart contract, on the other hand, thrives on the fact that its code
is immutable and state transitions can only occur according to the rules described by its code and once
executed are irreversible. Because of this, the capability to fix problems with the classical approach does
not exist in a smart contract environment. Flaws in a deployed smart contract can cause permanent
and unrecoverable damage. The situation gets worse if considered that one of the primary application of
smart contracts is the handling of valuable assets, including money. It is not uncommon that a bug in a
smart contract leads to the loss of large quantities of money [2]. The smart contract community is aware
of these risks and tries to counter them with intensive code reviews, including bug bounty programs and
the open sourcing of all the code. This processes can be expensive concerning the use of money and time.
To reduce the costs and accessibility related to smart contract development for non-specialized devel-
opers with a low budget, a smart contract programming language that is designed to aid the developer
in delivering safe and robust smart contracts is advantageous to have. Such a programming language
should help to detect and prevent bugs instead of providing pitfalls that are only avoidable by the more
experienced smart contract developers. The current programming languages used for programming smart
contracts where designed with the primary goal of making it easier for existing developers to transit to
the smart contract world. Because of that, their designers tried to use existing concepts and features
from non-smart contract programming languages and even copied semantic and syntactic aspects from
them.
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It has not been shown that programming in a smart contract environment is similar enough to other
programming environments to assume that concepts and paradigms that work there do work similarly
well for smart contracts. The potential to use new paradigms and concepts to prevent bugs and attacks
like those identified in [3] gives the motivation for creating a new smart contract programming language
which explores this possibility to come up with a solution.
1.3.1 Motivating Problems
The challenges and attack vectors identified in [3] are a core motivation for this work, and it is a primary
goal that Mandala can prevent these and potentially many other yet undiscovered attacks by design. A
summary of some of these challenges, problems and attack vectors is presented to increase the compre-
hension of this aspect of the motivation and is not meant to be a complete enumeration of all existing
problems identified but is meant to include the essential ones which contributed to attacks and bugs
resulting in the lost of large sums of money [3]. The summary uses the Ethereum [4] blockchain, the
Ethereum Virtual Machine(EVM) [5] and the Solidity [6] programming language for the examples as they
are the currently most used combination.
Open Execution Environment
Smart contract blockchains like Ethereum are open environments where everybody can deploy code in
the form of a smart contract. This code then can interact with other smart contracts. This openness
leads to the situation where most of the code that will ever run in the environment is unknown at the
time when a smart contract is developed and deployed, and it cannot be assumed that when a message
is sent or received that the communication partner is collaborative. The only entity on a blockchain that
can enforce a smart contracts behaviour is the virtual machine (current ones do not enforce much).
Reentrancy
The EVM is a single threaded virtual machine, but this fact does not mean that a call to a contract is
an atomic execution. In the case that a contract calls another contract, this contract can then call back
to the contract that called him, which may not expect this behaviour. This is called reentrancy and can
create dangerous security flaws if neglected [3]. A developer has to ensure that whenever another contract
is called all invariants hold to prevent reentrancy based flaws. It is not enough to enforce invariants after
the execution of a function.
Exception Handling
In Solidity, there are multiple situations where an exception can occur [3]. However, there is limited
support for handling these exceptions. Solidity knows two ways of calling a function. One variant returns
the result if no error occurred but does not allow to detect an error. The other variant tells the caller if
the call succeeded or resulted in an error but in case of success does not allow to retrieve the result of the
call. This encourages the developer to ignore errors as they are often more interested in the result than
the error.
Type Casts
Solidity has some statical type checking, but it is not a fully statically typed programming language.
One example is type casts on contracts which are neither checked at compile time nor runtime [3]. If
a Solidity function takes an address of a contract of a certain type as a parameter, the actual contract
code at that address may be completely different then the code expected based on the type. Due to this
a smart contract developer has to treat every call to an address as a call to unknown potential malicious
code, except if he formally can prove that it is actually of the expected type.
Transfering Ether
In Ethereum, there is more than one way to send Ether to a contract. The primary way is to send Ether
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along with an arbitrary function call. In that case, the receiver can reject the Ether by producing an
error or update its internal state to enforce its invariants. Another way is to use the send or transfer
function provided by Solidity, and in that case, the receiver can not update its internal state as the call
will not forward enough gas (resource needed to execute operations) with the intention of protecting the
caller from reentrancy attacks.
There are two lesser known ways to send Ether where the receiver neither can reject the Ether nor
can react on the incoming payment. First, a miner could use a smart contracts address as the coinbase
(address to receive the block reward) of a block which then leads to the situation where the smart contract
receives the block reward and the transaction fees of the mined block. The second way is to specify a
smart contracts address in a selfdestruct operation. If the deleted smart contract does hold any Ether,
the specified smart contracts receive the Ether.
Contract Selfdestruction
The Ethereum virtual machine does allow a contract to issue a so-called selfdestruct which does delete
any code associated with it, clears its stored values and transfers all Ether away. This has a negative side
effect as any contract that depends on another smart contract must account for the fact that the other
can vanish at any time, except if it can be formally proven that the target contract does never execute a
selfdestruct.
2 Methodology
In the previous section, a brief overview of the Mandala smart contract programming language concepts
was shown as well as the motivation for it and some problems currently used alternatives have. This
Section will show how creating Mandala is approached on a methodological level and what the expected
outcome is. The project consists of three core parts: A theoretical part consisting of the design and
specification of Mandala, where a first draft is described in this thesis. The implementation of a toolchain
allowing to compile and executeMandala, which can be used to develop smart contracts needed to validate
the Hypotheses presented later in this proposal.
2.1 Toolchain Architecture
The architecture of the toolchain as seen in Figure 1 is split into two parts the Mandala compiler that
produces bytecode from the source code and a virtual machine that verifies the integrity of the bytecode
and executes it. The integrity verification has only to be done once when the bytecode is deployed.
As Mandala uses concepts and paradigms that require more guarantees from a runtime then currently
established smart contract runtimes provide, existing runtimes cannot be used directly to execute Man-
dala, and as such, the customarily used approach of building a transpiler from Mandala bytecode to the
existing virtual machines bytecode cannot be used. This means that a new virtual machine for Mandala
is needed which has to run inside a blockchains consensus to be able to enforce, at runtime, the additional
guarantees needed by Mandala. To avoid programming a whole blockchain for Mandala, to enforce these
additional guarantees, this thesis leverages frameworks that allow only to implement the state transition
engine of a blockchain and the rest is provided. One such framework is parity substrate [11] which is part
of the polkadot project [12]. In case of Mandala the state transition engine would consist of the virtual
machine that includes at least a validator checking the integrity and an interpreter executing the smart
contracts.
An alternative to this approach would be using a technique presented in SmartDEMAP [7] where the
virtual machine consisting of a verifier and a transpiler are written in another smart contract language
and are executed as smart contract on an existing runtime whenever new Mandala code is deployed. For
this thesis the first approach is used and described in Figure 1 as the second needs to take the limitations
of the targeted blockchain into account which would result in a specialised implementation instead of a
generalised one.
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Figure 1: Mandala Toolchain Architecture
2.2 Validation
For validating the success of the process once the toolchain is in place, a set of well established and often
used smart contract concepts and categories are collected. The range of these may increase considerably
while this project progresses. At the current point in time potential candidates would be Fungible and
Non-Fungible Tokens, Voting Schemes, Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) and Initial Coin
Offerings (ICO’s). These applications are then implemented in Mandala. As Mandala is more generic
and flexible than currently used language, these concepts are wherever possible implemented as reusable
components in a standard library. They are implemented by using the concepts introduced over the
Hypothesises (See Section 4 Problem Statement and Research Questions) while avoiding the concepts
that they aim to replace. Failing to do so would mean that the used concepts and paradigms are
unsuitable for real-world use cases. The resulting programs are compared side by side to existing code in
other smart contract language achieving the same functionality to see if Mandala can serve as a practical
language that delivers on its promises.
An additional validation step is to collect attacks and problems that happened and are present in other
smart contract languages including those shown in the Section 1.3.1 Motivating Problems and analyse
them to shows if they can or can not happen in Mandala.
The smart contract application known as Fungible Tokens is used as an example throughout this
proposal to show different aspects of Mandala and explain its features and differences to other smart
contract languages. The most classical example of a fungible token is a basic cryptocurrency where the
token contains no other information besides its amount.
3 Related Work
The most relevant research category to Mandala is research related to programming language design and
implementation, especially smart contract programming languages. In this work, the term smart contract
programming language is used for any programming language that was designed with the intention
to develop custom applications that then run inside the consensus process of a blockchain. Classical
programming languages (non-smart contract programming languages) are relevant as well as most smart
contract programming languages do borrow concepts from established classical programming languages.
Some blockchains even use classical programming languages to program their smart contracts even if the
language was not explicitly designed with that purpose in mind. Also, classical programming languages
can provide guidance and inspirations when designing Mandala.
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Table 1: Blockchain Programming Languages
Name Inspiration Platform Remarks
LLL [13] Lisp EVM
Serpent [14] Phyton EVM
Vyper [15] Phyton EVM beta
Mutan [16] Go EVM deprecated
Solidity [6] Javascript EVM
Bamboo [17] Erlang EVM in development
RhoLang [18] RChain in development
Script [19] Forth Bitcoin
3.1 Smart Contract Programming Languages
This section of the related work will cover programming languages that deliver lessons learned and
inspirations for Mandala. Programming language design is a well-researched topic, and many different
programming languages, paradigms and concepts exist already. Not all of the available literature is equally
relevant in a smart contract environment. This section will look at various programming languages and
inspects how Mandala can contribute to the current situation and how it compares to existing smart
contract programming languages.
As smart contracts, geared towards general purpose blockchain programming, are a relatively new
concept [4] there are only a few productively used smart-contract programming language of that kind
and most others are still in development or count as experimental (see Table 1 for an overview). More
narrow smart contract languages existed a while longer science the invention of Bitcoin [8]. All of the
smart contract programming languages discussed in this section except for RhoLang [18] have in common,
that they were inspired by a classical programming language from which they borrowed parts of their
syntax and semantics. There are two reasons for that. First, a smart contract blockchain without a
programming language is unusable, and thus the first programming languages had to be developed fast
and taking a design that already exists and adapting it for the blockchain is faster than inventing an
entirely new programming language with new concepts from the ground up. Second, it makes it easier
for existing developers to learn the new programming language as some or even most of the concepts are
already familiar to them. The drawback of that approach is that developers may program in the new
programming languages similar two how they programmed in the corresponding classical programming
language without realising the differences that must be considered [10]. Another implication of that
approach is that many design decisions are inherited even if they are less beneficial or even harmful in
the context of smart contracts and blockchain and better alternatives would have existed.
Most of the programming languages as seen in Table 1 are still in development or an experimental state.
Of the remaining one, LLL is mainly used as an intermediary programming language when compiling
other smart contract programming languages or as a low-level programming language for the EVM [13].
Mutan was deprecated in favour of Solidity. The only left candidates for getting information originating
from productive usage are Script, Serpent, and Solidity. Script is very limited in its functionality and
was only intended to be used for validating the transfer of bitcoins [19]. Solidity is the most used and the
feature-richest of the remaining two. Even if not actively used the smart contract programming languages
Vyper, Bamboo and RhoLang which lack a productive ready release can give inside in the direction where
the field is heading.
Solidity is inspired by Javascript which has a focus on providing high productivity, as its primary
purpose was to program browser side UI logic, which is typically less security critical than server-side
logic and thus the prevention of bugs through language design and delivery of high performance were of
secondary concern in its initial design. Over time Javascript’s performance has significantly increased to a
level where it is even used to develop server applications. Solidity has inherited this focus on productivity
in its syntax and semantic but added some minimal additional features to make it more robust against
bugs and attacks by introducing a static type system. There are projects like Securify [20] that intend
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to improve the situation regarding the development of bugfree Solidity by providing formal verification
for it. Even if the syntax and semantic is inherited from a productivity-focused programming language,
the productivity of Solidity is none the less quite low as many resources have to be invested to do the
rigorous auditings and bug hunts needed to ensure that no bugs end up in deployed code were money is
at stake.
Serpent is inspired by Phyton a currently popular programming language with a focus on delivering
high productivity and is often used as a scripting language to automate tasks or analyse data. Serpent,
unlike Solidity, has not added a static type system to increase its robustness against bugs and attacks
but instead has a smaller feature set compared with Solidity or its inspirer Phyton which makes it more
streamlined and eliminates complex features that could accidentally introduce bugs and attack vectors.
Vyper is similar to Serpent inspired by Phyton, it even goes so far, that every valid Vyper program is
a valid Phyton program as well. Vyper was designed with the focus of helping the developer to prevent
bugs and eliminate attack vectors. Especially the ability of an auditor to quickly discover what a smart
contract does is in Vyper’s focus. This is done by adding a static type system and aiming for simplicity
by removing a lot of Phytons advanced concepts. Thanks to its Phyton syntax and added simplicity
Vyper provides compared to Solidity a higher productivity and delivers more robust results.
Bamboo is a programming language inspired by Erlang and other Actor based languages. It focuses
on explicitly modelling state transitions in contracts and preventing specific attack vectors related to
state sharing like reentrancy attacks. Its semantic model is designed with formal verification in mind,
guided by lessons learned in the ongoing Solidity formal verification projects. Delivering smart contracts
that are more robust is a goal of the project, but besides that, not much is known since the programming
language is still in an early stage of development and most information is vague and suspect to change
at this time.
RhoLang is not inspired by an existing programming language but instead is build with a process
calculi, a fundamentally different mathematical computation model as its core. Process calculi are often
used to do formal verification of concurrent or even distributed systems. RhoLang does not only aim to
provide formal verification for code written in the programming language but plans to formally verify
the compiler and the virtual machine it runs on as well. Thanks to its novel approach it promises a
high resistance against attacks and accidental bugs and should be very robust overall. As RhoLang is a
deterministic multi-threaded programming language, it has compared to the other languages presented
an increased performance. As its programming model is entirely different from what most developers are
used to it may have a negative impact on the learning curve. One major drawback of RhoLang is that it
needs a new virtual machine and blockchain (RChain [9]) as its computation model does not work well
with existing smart contract virtual machines.
All these programming languages can be used as inspiration and to extract lessons learned that should
not be repeated when designing Mandala. The main observation that is of importance for Mandala is
that all of the described programming languages either add features to make it more robust compared to
its inspirer or predecessor or have separate projects providing external tools to make the smart contracts
more robust against such flaws. This focus on delivering robust and save smart contracts is especially
noticeable in the second wave of smart contract programming languages (the ones currently developed
or in experimental use) and most have a shifted viewpoint to make the delivery of smart contracts
that are robust against bugs and attacks a central part of the programming language’s design. From
this observation, it can be concluded, that this property seems to be of high importance for any smart
contract programming language. Mandala will have the prevention of bugs and attack vectors at the core
of its design but will approach this from a different angle.
The current approach in developing smart contract programming languages by orienting them heavily
at classical programming languages assumes that smart contract environments are similar enough to other
programming environments and implies that proven concepts from classical programming languages are
well suited for smart contract programming languages as well. This assumption was never formally
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Table 2: Blockchain Programming Language Comparison
Name Type System Method-Dispatch Isolation Access Control Decidable
Mandala Fully Static 1 Static Type Based Capabilities Yes
Serpent Dynamic Dynamic Location Based ACL2 No
Vyper Weak Static 1 Dynamic Location Based ACL2 Yes
Bamboo unknown Dynamic Location Based ACL2 No
Solidity Weak Static 1 Dynamic Location Based ACL2 No
researched and has to be considered unproven. Some attacks and problems that are shown in [3] and
summarised in the Section 1.3.1 Motivating Problems, do hint in the direction that this assumption may
even be harmful concerning the development of smart contract programming languages and applications
with few bugs and high attack resistance.
Mandala will thus take another approach and evaluate new paradigms and concepts not or rarely
used in classical languages and applies them to smart contract languages with the goal of increasing its
robustness by using fundamentally different concepts instead of using an existing language and trying to
improve it to fit into a smart contract programming environment.
3.1.1 Comaprison with Mandala
In this section Mandala is compared with the other smart contract programming languages presented in
the previous section. The focus in this section is primarily on features, concepts and paradigms that are
designed to make the developed contracts less prone to bugs and other attack vectors. This section will
ignore RhoLang, as RhoLang has a fundamentally different approach which would make a comparison
complicated and mostly meaningless. In comparison to the remaining languages Mandala is different in
multiple core design aspects, as summarized in Table 2. The paradigms and concepts mentioned in this
sections will be explained in more details later in the Section 5 Proposed Solution and Research Idea.
This section does focus on the big conceptual differences and does not handle the smaller more nuanced
ones.
The most fundamental differences between Mandala and the compared smart contract languages is
how they handle state isolation, meaning who can access and modify state. This is of utter importance
to get right when providing a programming language that needs to be protected from flaws, bugs and
attacks. Solidity and co. are location-based, where code stored under the same address as a persisted
storage region has unlimited ability to manipulate that storage region where another piece of code has no
access to it at all. In Mandala, on the other hand, there is no association between a storage slot (called
a cell in Mandala) and any code. Instead, only those who can acquire a reference to the cell with the
corresponding capability (read and/or write) can interact with the cell. Mandala provides opaque types,
and references are of this kind and thus references cannot be forged but only retrieved from an entity
already able to access it which enables fine granular isolation.
The unique handling of values together with the strong static type system of Mandala is used to enable
a different paradigm in respect to how access control is realised. The compared smart contract languages
must rely on runtime checks to verify if the caller has the privilege to execute a particular action. The
caller is identified by the address of its contract. Mandala, on the other hand, does require the caller
to provide a value of a specific type, and only if he can obtain or create it, he can execute the guarded
function. These values represent capabilities which is a concept originating from security and real-time
focused operating systems like EROS [21]. As the type checking happens during compilation Mandala
can reject programs that attempt unauthorised access at compile-time.
A significant part in making a language better suited to program smart contracts that contain fewer
1Solidity, Vyper and Mandala have static type systems, where Mandala has a fully static one where no type related
errors at runtime can exist. Solidity and Vyper, on the other hand, can have type related problems at runtime.
2ACL: Access Control List
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Table 3: Inspiring Classical Programming Languages
Name Language Concepts and Paradigms
Rust [22] Ownership & Borrowing
Go [23] Composition over Inheritance
Java [24] Class Loader, Class File Verifier
Haskell [25] Algebraic Datatypes, Immutability
SML [26] Algebraic Datatypes, Immutability, Modules, Cells, Opaque Ascriptions
or no bugs and is more resistant against attacks is to make the language accessible to be inspected and
audited which enables an auditor to find more problems and increase the possibility that an auditor misses
no problem. Mandala has a specific property in this direction that gives it an edge over the other compared
languages. Mandala is entirely statically dispatched and provides no dynamic dispatches, meaning there
is never any uncertainty about what code is executed on a function call. Another edge of Mandala that
it shares with Vyper compared to the remaining languages is that both are decidable. Decidability is
a concept from the computational theory which states that a program written in that language halts
for any possible input. Neither Mandala nor Vyper are Turing complete languages which in Mandalas
case comes with the advantage that an upper bound on the resource usage for every transaction can be
computed which means that auditors can ignore the resource management aspects like gas used by the
other smart contract languages to prevent non-termination and denial of service attacks.
3.2 Inspirations from Classical Programming Languages
Classical high-level programming languages have existed for a much longer time than smart contract
programming languages, and the concepts and paradigms used in them have been continuously improved
since their invention. A new smart contract programming language can benefit from the discoveries made
during this evolution. When evaluating the concepts and paradigms from classical programming languages
in respect to their use in Mandala, the difference between classical programming environments and smart
contract environments has to be taken into account. Even if it cannot be assumed that something that
works for classical programming languages does work for smart contract programming languages equally
well, it can still be beneficial to look at those programming languages for inspiration. Different classical
programming language concepts and paradigms inspire and influenceMandala (See Table 3, for some core
inspiration). Smart contract virtual machines, especially the Ethereum virtual machine [5] are relatively
low-level and often behave more like a CPU than other modern virtual machines. Lately, there was an
increase in programming languages that compile to native code instead of bytecode for a virtual machine
and still being able to keep most of the concepts provided by modern high-level programming languages.
Go, and Rust does fall into this category. These programming languages deliver inspiration for theories
and design philosophies that do not need a feature-rich VM to be executed efficiently. On the other side,
there are advanced virtual machines like the JVM [27] which can give inspiration on how a good runtime
environment can be designed.
4 Problem Statement and Research Questions
The discussion on shortcomings above result in the problem statement for this thesis as follows:
The usage of smart contract programming languages based on concepts and paradigms invented for less
safety and security sensitive programming environments than a smart contract blockchain repeatedly led
and will lead to bugs and vulnerabilities that can cause a considerable financial loss.
To address the problem statement and find a way to improve the situation, the approach that is taken in
current smart contract programming language design and implementation is questioned, and two research
questions are formulated that ask for a different approach than the one currently used. These research
questions will guide the development of Mandala and influence the decisions made in Mandala’s design
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and implementation.
Research Question 1: What compilation and execution techniques can enforce compile-time guarantees
that enable the use of new concepts and paradigms in an open and adversarial execution environment?
Research Question 2: What programming language paradigms and concepts can improve the robustness
against bugs and attacks of smart contracts compared to the currently used ones?
To explore the research questions two hypothesises are presented that explore two alternative paradigms
that provide a potential path for finding answers to the proposed questions and improving the situation
described in the problem statement.
4.1 Hypothesis 1
Using opaque and substructural types in a smart contract language allows to use alternative location
independent isolation mechanisms that increase the robustness against bugs and attacks in an open and
adversarial execution environment
Opaque types is a concept used in functional languages like ML (opaque signature matching) [26] where
only code contained in the same module as a type declaration is aware of the inner workings and how to
read and create values of a type. Substructural types [28] is a concept partially (in the form of Unique
Types) used in languages like Rust which gives guarantees of how often a value of such a type is used.
In classical programming languages, this is used to improve memory and stack optimisations especially
in respect to garbage collection and memory shared between threads. The Hypothesis claims that these
two concepts together can not only be used for formal verifications and optimisation but can provide an
alternative isolation mechanism where the isolation happens on a per type/value basis instead of a per
contract basis. This promises a new programming paradigm better suited for smart contracts then the
current approaches based on storage isolation.
4.2 Hypothesis 2
Using a capability-based approach to access control in contrast to the currently used access control list based
approach in smart contract languages allows to reason about access control at compiletime and provides
a more flexible mechanism to safeguard interactions between different smart contract applications
Currently used smart contract languages and execution environments like Solidity, use access control
list based safeguarding mechanism. On a function call, they identify the caller and check if he has access
by looking up his address in a map recording the access rights. These maps can be statically filled with
addresses or dynamically managed at runtime. One standard approach is to capture the creator of a smart
contract and give him additional rights sometimes including the right to provide access rights to other or
even transfer his rights. Capability-based systems originate from operating systems, especially security
and reliability-focused operating systems like EROS [21]. A Capability is a reference to a resource that
simultaneously encodes the access rights to that resource. The Owner of a capability has the right to
permanently or temporarily give the capability to another process including all or a subset of the access
rights of the original. The Hypothesis claims that a capability-based approach allows capturing most
access control related bugs and attack vectors already at compiletime and that this mechanism is better
suited for smart contracts. Further, this approach reduces the runtime overhead of access management
and may even eliminate it in some cases reducing the expensive store operations needed for managing
them in languages like Solidity.
5 Proposed Solution and Research Idea
The problem statement and research questions provided guidance on what to address when designing
Mandala while the Hypotheses, promise a solution. This section will showcase ideas and concept, based
on the Hypotheses, which are intended to represent the foundational aspects of Mandala. A preliminary
design for Mandala will be presented with the help of code examples which showcase a Token like for
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example a new cryptocurrency. Also, a Purse that allows everybody to deposit such Tokens in it, but
only the owner of the Purse to withdraw them is introduced.
5.1 Mandala Core Design Philosophy
Mandala’s core goal is not to replace smart contract programming languages like Solidity or Vyper. The
existing EVM based programming languages try to give the developer access to the underlying blockchain
technology and expressively do that by giving the developer as many tools and freedoms to solve a problem
as possible. As already mentioned, this approach does have the drawback, that it is easier to introduce
bugs leading to unexpected behaviour and that it is harder for an auditor to spot these bugs in a smart
contract [10].
Mandala’s core design goal is to reduce the possibilities of unexpected behaviour that is introduced by
accident and make it easy for an auditor to reason about the code. Mandala should still be as expressive
as possible and covers any necessary features and concepts to be usable as a practical smart contract
language. In case of a trade-off between expressiveness and safety or auditability Mandala will prefer
the approach of increasing safety or auditability. In the following, two qualitative attributes are defined,
which are used to evaluate the robustness against bugs and attacks with an explanation of what they
mean in the context of Mandala.
Safety means that the programming language is designed in a way that prevents specific exploits and
makes it easy to write safe code and hard to introduce exploitable code without intention. The obvious
way to code something in Mandala should always be the safe way to code it. Mandala should eliminate
the risk that a developer can develop code that is vulnerable to specific well-known exploits, like the one
presented in the Section 1.3.1 Motivating Problems. Further Mandala will select its feature set primarily
based on safety aspects and only secondary on expressiveness and performance aspects.
Auditability means that it is easy to understand what a piece of code does and conclude how it
would behave if executed. Mandala will focus on local code, meaning that an auditor does not need to
know the whole program to reason about an individual piece of code. If context information is needed to
audit a piece of code, it should always be clear where to look for it, and it should be unambiguous how
it influences the currently audited code. Beside manual auditing, the auditability includes the ability of
Mandala code to be analysed by other programs, like automatic bug finders or formal verifiers.
5.2 Mandala Language Design by Example
This section will present Mandala with the help of code examples followed by some descriptions of the
concepts and feature used in the corresponding Examples. This is not meant to cover all features that
Mandala should have in the end.
5.2.1 Token
The Token module in Listing 1 provides a type that can be used to represent tokens including the necessary
functions needed to split, merge and create those tokens.
Listing 1: Token Module
1 module Token {
2
3 type Drop Pe r s i s t Token [T] ( UInt )
4
5 r i s k NumericOverflow
6 pub l i c merge [T] ( Token [T] ( amount1 ) , Token [T] ( amount2 ) ) => {
7 Token [T] ( amount1 + amount2)
8 }
9
10 r i s k NumericUnderflow
11
11 pub l i c s p l i t [T] ( Token [T] ( amount ) , s p l i t : UInt ) => {
12 (Token [T] ( amount−s p l i t ) , Token [T] ( s p l i t ) )
13 }
14
15 prot ec t ed [T] mint [T ] ( amount : UInt ) => Token [T] ( amount )
16 pub l i c d e f au l t [ Token ] ze ro [T ] ( ) => Token [T] ( 0 )
17
18 }
Modules
Line 1 in Listing 1 does declare a module which encapsulates components (types, capabilities and func-
tions) between the curly braces. Modules are Mandalas way to group related code together and it is
immutable after deployment, meaning that no components can be added, modified or removed from a
module once its content is declared. Additionally, components defined in the same module have extended
rights regarding each other and can do specific actions that components from other modules can not.
Types
On line 3 in Listing 1 a type component is declared. Mandala uses algebraic data types (ADT) as its
core value representation. An ADT is a type that has multiple constructors, and each of the constructors
can have multiple fields. When a value is created over a constructor, the values supplied for the fields
are stored in the value and can later be accessed by unpacking the value. A value can be unpacked
by providing a piece of code for each constructor, and at runtime, only the code corresponding to the
constructor used to create the value is executed and gets access to the parameter used to construct the
value. The type Token in the example does only have one constructor, which takes an unsigned integer as
field parameter. The type declaration on line 3 in Listing 1 is generic, meaning it can be parameterised
over another type denoted T in the example. This means that the declared type does not represent a
single type but a full type family. For Example, Token[Eth] and Token[Btc] are two different types which
belong to the same family. An ADT value can only be created by the module defining the type unless
the ADT is marked with open in that case everybody can create new instances.
Capabilities
By default, all values are restricted in how functions can interact with them. The only thing they can do
with a value is passing it to another function or using it as an argument to create another ADT. Even
accessing its fields, making a copy of it or throwing it away is forbidden. To allow further operations,
Mandala provides so-called capabilities which can be attached to values and are tracked statically by the
type system. A capability can only be attached by the module defining the capability unless the capa-
bility is marked with open in that case the module defining the type to which the capability is attached
to, can do so as well. Detaching a capability, on the other hand, can be done by everybody. Two values
that have the same base type but different capabilities are treated as different types by the type system.
Beside predefined capabilities, Mandala supports custom capabilities (See line 3 in Listing 2), which can
be used as an access control mechanism to protect access to components in a module. The type on line
3 in Listing 1 for example has per default the capabilities Drop and Persist. This allows everybody to
drop the value without using it (Drop) and enables the value to be persisted (Persist) (see Section 5.2.2),
but as still nobody can make copies of the value and only the defining module can create new values it
is well suited to represent a token or other asset.
Functions
Beside types, aMandala module can contain functions which are similar to functions from well-established
languages. To make interaction with ADTs easier, they can be unpacked at the place where they are
received as a parameter (See lines 6 and 11 in Listing 1). Like types, functions can have generic type pa-
rameters which allow defining a function once for a whole family of types. In Mandala functions cannot be
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recursive and further do only support static dispatch, meaning that it is known during compilation what
code will be executed when a function call is executed. The enforcement of non-recursivity is achieved by
allowing only function calls to already deployed functions requiring that functions in the same module be
deployed one after another. The function on line 16 in Listing 1 is marked with default, which tells the
Mandala compiler that it should use this function when a default value for the Token type is needed (see
Section 5.2.2). Every function has a visibility which defines who can call that function. The functions on
the lines 6, 11 and 16 in Listing 2 are public and can be called by anyone. A private function could only
be called from the same module. The mint function on line 15 in Listing 1 has the protected visibility
which is linked to the functions generic type parameter T. Code can only call a protected function if its
module defines the type to which the protected visibility is linked. The mint function, for example, can
only be used to mint tokens by the module defining the token’s type. As an example, a Token[Eth] can
only be minted by the Module defining the Eth type.
Error Handling
The presented merge and split functions in Listing 1 on the lines 6 and 11 allow to take a Token and
split it in two or take two Tokens and merge them. These two functions ensure that the balance of their
incoming and outgoing tokens sum up to the same amount. Mandala uses save arithmetic, and thus an
underflow or overflow error can happen which is represented with the risk declaration on the lines 5 and
10 in Listing 1. When an error occurs, the progress made in the function is rolled back. The caller of
the function receives the initial arguments to the function (to preserve non-copyable arguments) together
with an error code as the return value. The caller can decide to either handle the error or make a rollback
itself and forward the error.
5.2.2 Purse
The Purse module in Listing 2 provides a type that can be used to deposit and withdraw tokens from it
similar to a bank account, including the necessary access control mechanisms to keep the funds safe.
Listing 2: Purse Module
1 import Token .∗
2 module Purse {
3 open c ap ab i l i t y Withdraw
4
5 open type Pe r s i s t Withdraw Copy Drop Purse [T ] (
6 P e r s i s t Copy Drop Modify Ref [ P e r s i s t Drop Token [T ] ]
7 )
8
9 r i s k NumericOverflow
10 pub l i c a c t i v e depos i t [T ] ( Purse [T] ( tokenRef ) , d epos i t : Token [T] ) => {
11 modify tokenRef with Token ( t ) => merge ( t , d epos i t )
12 }
13
14 r i s k NumericUnderflow
15 pub l i c a c t i v e withdraw [T] (Withdraw Purse [T ] ( tokenRef ) , amount : In t ) => {
16 modify tokenRef with
17 Token ( t ) => case s p l i t ( t , amount ) o f
18 ( rem , s p l i t ) => rem & retu rn s p l i t
19 }
20 }
Imports
Line 1 in Listing 2 shows how functions and types from modules can be imported, such as they can be
used in another module. The example code imports the Token module which is colocated in the same
namespace as the Purse module. In the end Mandala will provide a more elaborated namespace and
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import system able to handle a large number of modules. For simplicity, the remaining examples will
skip the import and assume that all necessary components are imported.
Cells and References
Line 5 in Listing 2 is a type declaration similar to the Token from the previous example. The most
significant difference is that it uses an argument of type Modify Ref[Token[T]] for its sole constructor.
Values of type Ref[X] represent a reference to a cell persisting a value of type X. There can be multiple
references to the same cell allowing to share the stored value. The Modify capability allows using the
reference to exchange the value stored in the cell with another value. References without that capability
could only read the value. A cell can only store the value of a type with the Persist privilege. Everybody
can generate a cell, but it initially would be empty or filled with the default value if one is defined as it
is the case for Tokens (see Section 5.2.1). The creator of the new cell does only get a reference to the cell
and not the cell itself.
Effect System
The functions on line 10 and 15 in Listing 2 have a new keyword called active. By default, any function is
pure, which means that given the same arguments it will always return the same result and does not have
any side effect. As these two functions modify a cell, they have a side effect and thus must be marked
active. Beside active, there are the modifiers init which is similar to pure, but the function is allowed to
create new cells. Functions marked with dependent can additionally read values from cells, and active
ones can even write values to cells. This is an effect system which makes it easier for an auditor to see
what is going on and it further can prevent errors. The modify with expressions on the lines 11, 16 in
Listing 2 for example does take a pure expression that takes the current cells content and returns a new
value to be written back into the cell. As this expression is pure, it is guaranteed that it does not interact
with other cells while the value is under modification. This prevents shared state-based attacks.
5.2.3 Purse Storage
The PurseStorage module in Listing 3 provides functionality that allows everybody to retrieve the Purse
associated with an individual identity and deposit Tokens in it or even withdraw Tokens if he or she is
the owner of the Purse.
Listing 3: Purse Store Module
1 module PurseStorage{
2 open type Store [T] ( Copy Context [ Token [T ] ] )
3
4 pub l i c getMyPurse [T ] ( id : Master ID , Store [T ] ( c ) ) => Purse ( d e r i v e ( c , id ) )
5 pub l i c getPurse [T] ( id : ID , Store [T] ( c ) ) => Purse ( d e r i v e ( c , id ) ) . detach [Withdraw ]
6
7 r i s k NumericOverflow
8 r i s k NumericUnderflow
9 pub l i c a c t i v e t r a n s f e r [T ] ( s r c : Master ID , to : ID , s t o r e : Store [T] , va lue : In t ) => {
10 depos i t (
11 getPurse [T] ( to , s t o r e ) ,
12 withdraw ( getMyPurse [T ] ( src , s t o r e ) , va lue )
13 )
14 }
15 }
Identification
In Listing 3 on line 4, 5 and 9 a new type called ID and a capability called Master is used. The ID type is
a primitive type similar to the address type used in solidity and the ethereum virtual machine. Everybody
can generate an ID if he knows the corresponding identification string. However, an ID with the Master
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capability cannot generally be generated. Every keypair used to access the blockchain running Mandala
is associated with an ID. To obtain a value of the type Master ID that can be used in a transaction the
transaction has to be signed with the associated private key. Besides using a private key, Master ID’s
can be created by calling the new function in the ID module which then produces a unique ID with the
Master capability. The new function does guarantee that it will never produce the same ID twice and
that each ID is different from all ID’s associated with private keys.
Contexts
In Listing 3 on line 2 a type called Context is introduced. A Context is similar to an ID as new unique
once can be created by calling a new function in the Context module. Unlike ID’s, Contexts have a
generic type parameter and as such their exist a whole family of Context types, one for each existing
type. The primary purposes of Contexts are to associate an ID with a reference. Given an ID and a
Context[T] someone can call the derive function (see line 4 and 5 in Listing 3) to generate a Reference to
a Cell containing a value of type T. Using the same ID and Context as derive input always results in the
same reference while using a different combination always yields a different reference. A Context can be
seen as a storage area for cells where each cell is associated with an ID. From this viewpoint, the Store
type provides a 1 to 1 association between IDs and Purses.
5.2.4 Token Instantiation
The MyFixSupplyToken module in Listing 4 declares a new Token with the help of the previously pre-
sented modules and deposits the initially minted Tokens into the deployers Purse.
Listing 4: Token Instance Module
1 module MyFixSupplyToken {
2 pub l i c type MyToken
3
4 pub l i c va l d e f au l t S t o r e = Store [MyToken ] ( Context . new [ Token [MyToken ] ] ( ) )
5
6 r i s k NumericOverflow
7 i n i t ( dep loyer : Master ID) => depos i t (
8 getMyPurse ( deployer , d e f au l t S t o r e ) ,
9 mint [MyToken ] (100000000)
10 )
11
12 }
Constant Values
For Mandala to be useful, there has to be a way to store a value globally in a way that it is accessible
without the need to possess already another value (like it is the case with cells and references). Depending
on the blockchain model in which Mandala is used this could be delegated to another layer. For example,
a UTXO based blockchain could storeMandala values in UTXO’s and an account based blockchain could
store them in the accounts. To be independent to a specific blockchain model line 4 in Listing 4 shows
an alternative where Mandala provides a top-level storage slot called val. A val represents a constant
that is initialised when the contract is deployed and does never change afterwards. To be independent of
the point in time when the module is deployed the vals initialisation expression must be of pure or init
effect. As a val can be used more than once over the span of multiple transactions its content must have
the Copy and Persist capability.
Initialisation
In Listing 4 on line 7 an initialisation function that has precisely one Master ID parameters is provided.
This function is executed exactly once when the module is deployed. The received Master ID is the
one associated with the deployer of the module. This allows a hook to initialisation the module. If the
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initialisation produces an error, then the module will not be deployed. In Listing 4 on Line 8 to 9, for
example, a fixed amount of Tokens is created and put into the Purse of the deployer.
5.3 Discussion of the Mandala Language Proposal
The two core qualitative goals of Mandala concerned safety and auditability. This section will show how
the presented approach for Mandala aims to achieve these goals.
5.3.1 Safety
Safety is concerned with the elimination of the risk for a developer to introduce bugs, flaws and other
problems into the code without the intention to do this. The Section 1.3.1 Motivating Problems provided
examples for such problems that are a concern in other smart contract programming languages. This
section will look at these problems and show how Mandala can address them.
Open Execution Environment
By default Mandala values have no capabilities, and nearly nothing can be done with them. The defining
module can still do more with the value as it is entitled to attach open capabilities or capabilities defined
in the same module. This allows declaring value types that enforce guarantees even against code not yet
deployed. Further Mandala uses such values as capabilities to control who can do what with it. This
allows enforcing that a module/function needs to be handed a capability willingly before it can interact
with the protected resources. This allows a programming style where no manual protection layer that
specifies what has to be done to acquire access to a resource has to be provided. This has the advantage
that nothing has to be known about other potentially later deployed code to be protected from it as all
code plays by the same rules independent of when and where and by whom it is deployed.
Reentrancy
Reentrancy problems occur when a state is shared between invocation of functions that do not enforce
invariants in its intermediary state which then is leveraged by an attacker. The classical reentrancy attack
where the same function or a function in the same contract (module in case of Mandala) is called cannot
happen at all in Mandala as Mandala does only support static dispatch and does not allow recursive
calls, or other circular dependencies.
As Mandala cells are accessed over a reference, multiple Modules could obtain a reference and gain ac-
cess to the same shared state. To prevent inconsistent invariants of a cell during its modification Mandala
provides a particular mechanism to modify a cell where the modification is represented as a pure state
transition function. This guarantees that when a cell is modified in this way no other function can access
any other cell while a cell is changed. A developer can misuse the modify mechanism to reopen itself to
these kinds of attacks but it would require an effort to do so and would be complicated and sophisticated
and would be easy for an auditor to spot and investigate.
Exception Handling
Mandala does not inherit the weaknesses of Solidity and other EVM based languages in respect to error
handling because errors are not communicated over the classical return path, and thus a caller can do
both handle the error and consume the return value on success. Mandala further enforces that all po-
tential errors are documented in the function signatures, and thus the caller does always either need to
handle the error case or explicitly declare the error again delegating the error handling to its caller.
Type Casts
Mandala has a type system that does not have the concept of a typecast as any value is of exactly one
type. It could be argued that attaching and detaching capabilities is a typecast, but these are checked at
compiletime and cannot be misused to execute unexpected code like it is possible in solidity. Mandalas
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type system ensures that all type related errors are detected during compilation and no type related
errors can occur at runtime.
Transfering Ether
Mandala will provide a completely independent definition of Ether (resp the native cryptocurrency of
the targeted blockchain), realized over the Token framework from the Listings 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Moreover, as such, it does not gain any special treatment, and the only way to transfer Ether is to call
a function that takes a Token[Eth] as a parameter. This concept guarantees that the receiver is always
equipped to handle the Ether and can react appropriately.
Contract Selfdestruction
Mandala does not know the concept of a contract. Mandalas module is the nearest thing to a contract.
Modules can be created but never destroyed preventing any self-destruct related problems as this concept
is not known. If cells are considered as the state part of a contract, then the cell either has a default
value, or the compiler will enforce the developer to specifies the behaviour in case the cell is empty.
5.3.2 Auditability
Mandala has certain core aspects that make the job of an auditor easier. The first is that Mandala
does not have dynamic method dispatch and does not support recursion even indirect ones. This means
that an auditor can know for sure what code is executed by a function call and even the deployment
of other code in the future cannot change that. Second, the non-recursivity ensures to an auditor that
all code executes and terminate without having to consider unexpected events like out of gas exceptions
(common in EVM based language). This is the case becauseMandala allows enforcing upfront (before the
transaction is executed) that enough resources are provided for any possible execution path. Moreover,
Mandalas strong static type system with its restricted types tells an auditor precisely what can be done
with values of a type without needing him to inspect any code that interacts with the value. This allows
to analyse a module and check its integrity even if the auditor does not know how other code will use the
module and its types. Lastly, the improved exception handling system (compared to Solidity and co.)
does make it easier for an auditor to check that every corner case is handled correctly since exceptional
cases have to be declared in the function signature. As many problems are related to unwanted state
changes, Mandalas effect system can indicate to an auditor where to look for these problems and what
functions can be safely ignored when investigating state-related problems.
6 Summary and Preliminary Conclusions
This research proposal analysed the current situation for existing smart contract programming languages.
The proposal identified the need for improvement in safety and auditability aspects. Then the thesis
provides research questions and hypotheses that promise a way to develop a more robust, safer and easier
to audit smart contract programming language that addresses the existing problems and challenges by
using alternative concepts and paradigms.
Guided by the path presented by the research questions and hypotheses a new smart contract program-
ming language called Mandala is proposed. Mandala’s overall design goals focus on improving safety and
audit-ability while retaining the practical usability and promises to prevent currently existing weaknesses
and attack vectors that plague current smart contract programming languages.
Mandala provides concepts like substructural and opaque types that allow expressing concepts like
cryptocurrency tokens and other assets directly as first-class citizens of the programming language. These
types are realised and extended over so-called capabilities an idea inspired by security-oriented operating
systems, which allows enforcing access to protected functionality already during compiletime instead of
runtime.
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The research proposal shows that in theory alternative programming language concepts and paradigms
that leverage compilation in a trusted execution environment can provide a viable solution to improve
the current state of smart contract programming.
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